I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I contend that there are current, notable examples of the de-medicalisation of assisted death. Although assisted dying has been most commonly presented within a medicalised framework -a framework revolving around medical concepts and terminology, illnesses and medical professionals -the notion of de-medicalisation is employed to suggest that there are emerging models of assisted dying in which some medical aspects assumed to be an integral part of the phenomenon are both challenged and diminished. Within the social and legal debate surrounding assisted death, the focus in recent times appears to have moved away from a medic's involvement in a clinically assisted death to "suicide tourism" and particularly, the matter of relatives "assisting" by making travel arrangements and accompanying their loved ones to a country in which according to local law, they can receive assistance to die. Debbie Purdy's ultimately successful legal action, swiftly followed by the publication of the DPP's' interim and final policies for cases of assisted suicide and the related public consultation, 1 have ensured that the matter of relatives facilitating assisted  Law School, Lancaster University. I am grateful to John Coggon for his valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Thanks are also due to Marleen Eijkholt, who kindly provided a translation of the Dutch case discussed in section III. A), and to Hazel Biggs and the two reviewers for the Medical Law Review. Responsibility for any errors remains with the author. This paper is an output of the AHRC funded project, For those who find themselves in such a desperate situation that they decide to end their own lives (whether this is the result of their medical condition or other factors or events in their 25 Kennedy, 1981: 154 . 26 See also AM Capron, 'Legalizing Physician-Assisted Death ' (1996) 5 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 10, 11. 27 'Some ideals about dying well seem nearly universal: a death occurring after a long and successful life, at home, without violence or pain, with the dying person being at peace with his environment and having at least some control over events.' CF Seale and S van der Geest, 'Good and bad death: introduction ' (2004) lives), there are a variety of medical and non-medical means of committing suicide. 32 However, these methods are only available to those who have the physical ability to make use of them and thus, those who lack this ability are left requiring another person's assistance to die. Significantly, legal, ethical and social discourses surrounding assisted dying and laws that have permitted assisted dying have tended to focus on the assistance of doctors, the provision of medicine to cause death and medical grounds for requesting death, that is, pain and suffering derived from medical conditions. 33 As such, medicine has provided the main frame of reference, a vital component of the phenomenon of assisted death. The common phrase "physician assisted suicide" (PAS) makes this abundantly clear. Salem argues that PAS:
presupposes that medicine has passed judgment on the act of suicide… as long as the physician is in charge of assisting the patient -either by his or her presence or by supplying the medical means to perform the act -physician-assisted suicide entails the medicalisation of the act of suicide… the decision to die by suicide is treated precisely as if it were a set of clinical problems to be solved medically -the 'private', 'intimate', 'selfdeterminating' decision to commit suicide is translated into a clinical event. Given that assistance in suicide is requested in order to bring an end to suffering and distress, it is not surprising that the cause of death also tends to be medicalised, and is commonly perceived as such, since medication is considered to offer the quickest, humane non-violent end. 35 As I will discuss in this paper, however, less medicalised and completely de-medicaIised instances of assisted death do occur. A well-publicised example of partially de-medicalised assisted death occurred in Australia in 1996, during the short period in which assisted suicide and euthanasia were lawful in the Northern Territory. 36 Dr Philip Nitschke devised a process of computerised assisted death. He provided patients with intravenous access and connected the infusion tubing to a laptop computer. The patients then had to answer three questions which appeared on the computer screen by pressing certain keys. The final question was as follows: 'If you press this button, you will receive a lethal injection and die in 15 seconds -Do you wish to proceed?' If the patient answered all the questions affirmatively, the computer automatically switched on a previously prepared solution of a fatal dose of the sedative Nembutal. 37 The use of modern technology might make this example of partially de-medicalised assisted death seem somehow dehumanised. However, Nitschke stated in an interview that the process 'allowed me to leave the immediate personal space of the patient, so that the family could enter and be closest to the patient when the button was pushed'.
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Thus, arguably, far from removing the human element, de-medicalising assisted death in this way can remove the external presence of a medic and enable the act of dying to be a more personal and private experience for the person to share with those she or he is closest to. This is at least one 9 reason that can be given in support of calls for the de-medicalisation of assisted death which have appeared of late in the academic literature.
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I am applying the term "de-medicalisation" in the context of assisted death in a number of ways in this paper. First, I utilise it to highlight the way in which attention has moved away somewhat from the medical aspects of assisted death. Concentrating on the role that relatives play in the process of assisted dying by accompanying a loved one abroad may alter perceptions of assisted death as being a wholly medical phenomenon, and encourages the use of a less medicalised discourse which takes emotional factors into greater account. Secondly, I claim that cases where non-medics assist an individual to die raise important questions concerning the basis on which the involvement of a doctor legitimises assisted death. Such cases should cause us to ask why a more medicalised conception of assisted dying is appropriate or inappropriate and therefore, whether demedicalisation is the way forward. Finally, I turn to the common perception that if assisted death is lawful, it should only be available to those whose suffering is the result of a medical condition. If the availability of an assisted death is extended to those experiencing existential suffering, as has been advocated by some, then this could truly amount to a notable form of de-medicalised assisted dying.
In addressing these issues, the three areas of medicalisation that I am questioning are: the process of assisted dying; medicalisation of the assistor; medicalisation of the reason for requesting assisted dying. 
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Of all of these cases, and others, it is probably the Daniel James case which attracted the most publicity, no doubt because of Mr James' young age (twenty three), the fact that his condition 40 Section 59 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 simplified the wording of the s.2 offence so that it applies to 'an act capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another person' where the defendant intended to encourage or assist. 41 It has presumably prevented some from assisting. For example, Debbie Purdy claimed she would not allow her husband to assist her unless the current legal position was clarified. 'Debbie Purdy: "We've got our lives back"' The Independent, he concluded that it was not in the public interest to bring a prosecution. 52 The DPP emphasised the fact that Mr and Mrs James did not influence their son and that he was 'a mature, intelligent and fiercely independent young man with full capacity to make decisions about his medical treatment'.
That they did not stand to gain (financially or otherwise) from their son's death was also an important factor in the DPP's decision. In his view, their actions were 'towards the less culpable end of the spectrum' of acts that were prohibited under s.2(1).
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For Daniel James and others who need assistance to die, the external power of the law denies them the possibility of an assisted death in their home, local area or indeed, their country of residence and their reaction to the legal prohibition of assisted suicide is to travel elsewhere, with 49 See the assistance of a relative, in order to experience the kind of death which they seek. Thus, this nonmedical part of the process of assisted dying in such cases is occurring because English law prohibits assisted death. The final act of assisted dying in such cases is, at least in part, a medical one, since death is caused by the ingestion of lethal medication prescribed by a physician in Switzerland.
However, the recent focus on the involvement of relatives in the earlier stages of the process of assisted suicide is indicative of a certain de-medicalising of assisted death, because media coverage of assisted death and the attention of the public, prosecutors, law-makers and judges is directed on a non-medical aspect of assisted dying.
Besides drawing attention to the earlier non-medical parts of the process, RFASA cases also emphasise the significance of relatives being present during the final stages of an assisted death.
There are a number of reasons why it might be important for individuals seeking an assisted death to have their relatives present for the final act of assisted suicide, and why this could be an essential part of their experience of an assisted death. First, this may make the assisted death feel less medicalised and less clinical and thus, a less tense affair. Secondly, it might reassure the person concerned that their relatives approve of their decision, or at least that they are at peace with their decision to die. Thirdly, they may need the emotional support that their relatives provide. 54 Their experience of assisted death is therefore a better death because they are accompanied throughout the process by their loved ones. Lesley Close, who accompanied her brother to Switzerland for an assisted suicide through Dignitas, emphasised the significance of his 'chance to say goodbye, to interact with us at that last moment.' 55 According to Dr Turner's son, the family 'chatted, sang some songs and joked' in the final hours before her death. 56 For relatives, being present at their loved one's death may be equally important so that they can see their wish for an assisted death being 54 I recognise that the first and third of these reasons for having relatives present during the final act of dying would also apply in the context of a 'natural' death, a point to which I will return in the concluding section. In most cases [the Code's] application will ensure predictability and consistency of decision-taking, and people will know where they stand. But that cannot be said of cases where the offence in contemplation is aiding or abetting the suicide of a person who is terminally ill or severely and incurably disabled, who wishes to be helped to travel to a country where assisted suicide is lawful and who, having the capacity to take such a decision, does so freely and with a full understanding of the consequences. There is already an obvious gulf between what section 2(1) says and the way that the subsection is being applied in practice in compassionate cases of that kind.
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Lord Hope also highlighted the very real possibility that in other cases, factors which did not apply in the Daniel James case might be present, such as the relatives standing to gain a benefit (financial, for example) from the individual's death. Yet such a potential benefit in itself might not mean that prosecution would be in the public interest. 72 Thus, the DPP's decision in the Daniel James case was specific to its facts and did not clarify the likely position regarding prosecution for others who wished to assist a relative's suicide. There is indeed likely to be a financial benefit in many cases of RFASA and RAS. As Mullock has opined, surely a number of those relatives in RFASA cases such as those mentioned above must have received some kind of financial gain by virtue of inheritance after the assisted suicide, but regardless, none have been prosecuted. 73 The only conclusion can be that Lord
Hope's view is correct; financial gain in itself is not going to lead to a decision that it is in the public interest to prosecute. In September 2009, the DPP fulfilled the obligation that the House of Lords' judges placed him under, and produced an interim policy regarding cases of assisted suicide for public consultation. 75 After this consultation, the final policy was published in February 2010. 76 It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage in a detailed analysis of the policy, but briefly, it outlines public interest factors in favour of prosecution in cases where, amongst other things: 77 As is recognised within the policy, some (including this author) may consider that referring to the individual who commits suicide with assistance as a 'victim' is problematic (CPS, 2010: 1). On a legal level, the status of 'victim' implies that a criminal offence or civil wrong has been committed against the individual. Whilst it is indeed true that the act of assisting suicide amounts to a crime, on a moral level, I seriously doubt that it constitutes a wrong against the individual who wishes to die and seeks assistance in order to do so. 78 See below, n.196.
 the suspect was acting in her/his capacity as a person involved with an organisation or group that provides a physical environment in which another can commit suicide 79 Conversely, there are public interest factors tending against prosecution if, amongst other things:
 the victim 'had reached a voluntary, clear, settled and informed decision to commit suicide'
 the suspect was 'wholly motivated by compassion'
 the suspect's actions 'were of only minor encouragement or assistance'
 the suspect's actions could 'be characterised as reluctant encouragement or assistance in the face of' the victim's determined wish to commit suicide 80 Any one factor can be considered to 'outweigh a number of other factors which tend in the opposite direction' 81 and thus, for example, if there is clear evidence that the suspect was motivated by gain, this might outweigh the existence of several of the public interest factors against prosecution listed above. One potential difficulty here is that this motivation of gain is surely not going to be easy to prove and the mere fact that the assistor stands to gain could exist in many cases, as discussed above. The DPP's policy notes that 'sometimes… the only source of information about the circumstances of the suicide… is the suspect' and advocates a 'common sense approach' to the issue of whether a person stood to gain, emphasising that the 'critical element is the motive behind the Notably, as Lord Brown observed in Purdy, whilst the DPP has produced statements providing details of the policy for prosecution in the case of other offences, such statements have been issued for the benefit of the victims of offences such as rape, rather than for the benefit of prospective offenders. But reliance on the Article 8 rights of individuals who require assistance in their suicides justified the production of a policy statement to effectively assist would-be assistors.
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This only serves to emphasise the uniqueness of the legal reaction to cases involving RFASA. It may well have become necessary to produce this policy because Parliament did not envisage the phenomenon of suicide tourism when the s.2(1) offence was drafted. Nonetheless, the result is that the impact of RFASA cases has meant that those who violate the law by assisting a suicide are effectively being treated differently than all other offenders, by being given specific guidance as to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion regarding their criminality. Significantly, therefore, the focus on the non-medical role played by relatives has moved the law on assisted suicide forward.
There was clear judicial sympathy for relatives in Omar Puente's predicament in the Purdy case. Such cases were described as compassionate by more than one of the judges; both Lord Hope and Baroness Hale referred to the actions of relatives who assist a loved one to travel abroad for an assisted suicide as 'compassionate assistance'. 84 In Lord Neuberger's view, RFASA cases are 'difficult and tragic cases where a loving relative assists a person, who is of sound mind and determined to end her life, to travel abroad to achieve her wish in a country where assisting suicide is not unlawful' 85 and he considered that a relative in such a case 'will often be a relatively reluctant participator, and will often be motivated solely by love and/or sympathy'. 86 Such an understanding of compassionate and reluctant assistance is mirrored in the DPP's policy. 87 It is surely true that more compassion is likely to be felt for a relative who assists a loved one to die in this way than a health care professional who assists in the final act causing death. Although, as Biggs notes, the euthanasia case of R v Cox 'provoked an emotional response from those who were involved', 88 it was arguably not so much that the jury and judge felt compassion for the doctor's situation, but rather, that they were sympathetic to his motivation. In contrast, it is easier to feel compassion for a relative assistor because of the dilemma they find themselves in when their loved one asks for their assistance to die, a dilemma which must be exacerbated by the strong attachment they have. Horder has differentiated relatives from other parties involved in assisted dying on the basis that the former act compassionately because they are 'caught in the maelstrom of circumstances'.
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Given the common shared experience of being in a close, loving relationship, more people can imagine themselves in the position of a relative assistor than a medic assistor. It goes without saying that no one in a loving relationship such as that of Ms Purdy and Mr Puente would wish to be in this predicament. But arguably, if we imagine ourselves faced with the same situation, many of us could understand why relatives decide to assist and no doubt some of us might see ourselves doing the same for our loved ones. Centring proposals for law reform on de-criminalising RFASA cases means that the controversial medical issues of public trust in the medical profession and of assisted death being against ethical principles that the medical profession abides by are not crucial obstacles that must be overcome, as they are when proposed reforms related to physician assisted death. Rather, these issues are left for the country in which assisted suicide is lawfully practised. However, as I will later argue, any reform which does relate to RFASA cases may pave the way for future reform that could relate to PAS and thus, to a re-medicalisation of the debate. That permitting RFASA was the first step on a slippery slope to legalising assisted dying was certainly a concern for some of the peers who participated in the House of Laws debate on Lord Falconer's amendment.
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In sum here, RFASA cases pose significantly different issues than more medicalised cases of assisted dying such as Cox for example. the social and legal debate regarding RFASA cases much more; there is a real sense of empathy with the predicament that relatives face. This seems to be at least part of the reason why prosecutions have not been brought in the case of relatives who accompany an individual abroad for an assisted death 98 and why the matter of prosecution and possible law reform has become a particular concern for the judiciary and legislature of late. Whether this means that legal reform should be framed around such cases of de-medicalisation is a different matter, which I will consider in the final section.
IV. THE PHENOMENON OF ASSISTED DYING AS LESS OF A MEDICAL ISSUE

A. Mercy killings, RAS cases and the involvement of (professional) non-medics in the final act of assisted death
The prominence of the phenomenon of RFASA may well have turned the social and legal debates regarding assisted suicide away from a more medicalised framework. 102 See 'Assisted Suicide man walks free', above n.99. much harder to resist fulfilling their loved one's wish that their suffering be brought to an end.
Examining the case of those who take on the role of informal carer for an individual suffering from a chronic condition and provide assistance with that individual's suicide (most often a relative or spouse), Biggs considers the impact of the close relationship between the carer and the cared for person: 'Not only does this make informal carers vulnerable to pressures that professional carers might reasonably be expected to resist, it can also generate a sense of obligation that will encourage a carer to comply with the will of the cared for person.'
103 Yet Biggs argues that if carers assist and criminal culpability is established, the law will draw little distinction between them or a health care professional who assists. 104 In the context of relatives and spouses who carry out mercy killings and are charged with murder, however, I have suggested elsewhere that the availability of the defence of diminished responsibility to reduce the charge to one of voluntary manslaughter means that such defendants can be treated more leniently by the law than physicians who carry out euthanasia. 105 It also seems that the judiciary tends to carry this leniency through to the sentencing stage.
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The defence of diminished responsibility is currently available in mercy killing cases if the defendant was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning arising from a recognised medical condition which substantially impaired the defendant's ability to do one or more of the following: understand the nature of her/his conduct; form a rational judgement; exercise selfcontrol). The abnormality of mental functioning must have been a significant contributory factor in causing him/her to act. 107 Given the accepted reliance on this defence in such cases, it is here that the legal response evidences a clear medicalised approach to otherwise non-medicalised instances of assisted death. Psychiatric experts play a considerable role in determining whether the defence of diminished responsibility will be available, since it is their assessment as to whether the mercy killer may evidence an assumption that external involvement in an assisted death should come from a doctor and thus, an acceptance of the dominant medical model of assisted death. As I will argue later, this need not be the case.
Whilst RAS and mercy killings are forms of assisted dying that clearly lack a medical dimension, they do not necessarily indicate that assisted suicide is becoming de-medicalised. Those who are assisted in their death by relatives or friends could not have received PAS under the law in this jurisdiction, and thus their positions have not become de-medicalised; they were never medicalised in the first place. However, in Switzerland, a different form of lawful non-medic assisted death has attracted legal and social attention which may be more indicative of a move towards partial de-medicalisation, because it is a newer phenomenon occurring as part of a process which also involves a doctor. Assisted suicide is a criminal offence under Article 115 of the Swiss Penal
Code if carried out for reasons of self interest. 112 The context in which assisted suicide is lawful as a founded in 1998. 118 The four right-to-die organisations provide assistance to individuals throughout the assisted suicide process. For Dignitas, this process involves a number of steps:
1. The individual requesting an assisted suicide must become a member of the organisation.
2. S/he must send a letter to Dignitas stating the reason for requesting an assisted suicide, accompanied by a medical file/report regarding diagnosis, prognosis etc.
3. There is an initial assessment of whether Dignitas' guidelines are satisfied (the individual must be suffering from a fatal disease or have an unacceptable disability). 4. Dignitas finds one of their collaborating Swiss physicians who will state an initial willingness to write a prescription (usually about two and a half months after the initial request).
5. An appointment with this physician is made and the physician conducts a detailed medical assessment of the individual. A period of around two months is usual between this and the next step. 120 Although it has been alleged by a former senior member of staff at Dignitas, Soraya Wernli, that 'Some foreigners -Germans and English -would come to Zurich in the morning, be taken to the doctor and by midafternoon they were dead. ' 140 But ascertaining the nature and extent of non-medical suffering is a highly subjective task, and conclusions as to whether such suffering is 'unbearable' could vary in each individual case. Thus, a potential danger of loosening the medical criteria for assisted death is that it becomes harder to identify and maintain boundaries.
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That being said, it may actually be no more of a subjective task than ascertaining the level of pain caused by medical conditions, since it is a well known fact that everyone has different pain thresholds. 142 A further related danger is that in extending the criteria to non-medically based suffering, society risks encouraging an assisted dying culture, with an assisted death being seen as an option whenever life becomes especially taxing or difficult. 143 And related to this concern, we might ask whether assistance should really be provided if the person is not prevented from ending their own life by a medical condition. The answer here may differ depending on whether the person before us is an able-bodied person, or a person who is increasingly immobile not because of a medical condition, but simply because of old age. Moreover, the answer may also depend on the level of assistance that is required to enable the individual to avail himself/herself of the best possible death (for example, providing a lethal prescription of drugs may be necessary to facilitate this, whereas administering a lethal injection may not). Such questions and concerns explain the tendency of calls for the legalisation of some form of assisted death to be limited to cases where unbearable or intolerable suffering is of a medical origin.
Perhaps extending permissible assisted death to cases of existential suffering is also problematic because of problems of defining such suffering, beyond being able to say that it is 140 HRW Pasman, ML Rurup, DL Williams and BD Onwuteaka-Philpsen, 'Concept of unbearable suffering in context of ungranted requests for euthanasia: qualitative interviews with patients and physicians' (2009) 339 BMJ b4362. 141 There is, therefore, a policy reason for justifying what appears to be an arbitrary distinction; we might accept that existential pain and suffering could be as unbearable as suffering deriving from a medical condition, but maintain that a line should be drawn between the two because this better safeguards against abuse. This is a similar line of approach to that adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in Pretty v UK when considering Article 8(2) of the ECHR (at para 74). 142 See Capron, 1996: 22 . 143 Huxtable and Möller, 2007, 124. caused by social rather than medical factors. It has been suggested that individuals can become so "weary of life" that they wish to die because of 'circumstances such as the loss of a partner, increasing isolation due to death of people around them, and physical ailments [which] can make everyday life… a negative experience'. 144 But confusion is caused by the existence of a more medicalised notion of existential pain. Strang et al argue that there is no uniform definition of "existential pain", but rather, there are varying ideas that it is constituted by existential suffering and/or pain as it is physically understood. 145 The results of their study involving chaplains, palliative physicians and pain specialists revealed that:
The survey in 2005 suggest that only a minority would support the occurrence of assisted death in such a situation. 154 Participants were asked whether they would support a change in the law to permit assisted dying in questions framed around a medicalised presentation of reasons for requesting assisted death. 155 They were asked for their opinion in a situation where (i) an individual has a terminal, incurable and painful illness, or (ii) an incurable, painful but non-terminal illness, or (iii) is 'not in much pain nor in danger of death, but becomes permanently and completely dependent on relatives for all their needs'. 156 There was a strong level of support for legal change in respect of the first situation (four out of five people), which decreased to 45 per cent in the second situation and 43 per cent in the third. As the lowest number of participants supported lawful assisted dying where an individual's medical condition is not terminal or incurable, it is not unreasonable to surmise that this number would have decreased again if they had been presented with a case where the suffering was existential.
It is undeniably more controversial to advocate assisted death when the cause of the suffering is non-medical. But is this in fact a consequence of the power of the medical model of assisted death? Have we become so imbued by medicalisation that the idea that suffering which originates from a non-medical cause could be unbearable is automatically rejected as fallacious? And because assisted death is so commonly placed within a medical framework, does this not promote the perception that its practice can only be controlled if it remains within the confines of the medical 155 'We presented respondents… with descriptions of patients with different conditions, a number of which were incurable or terminal… The public acceptability of voluntary euthanasia clearly depends on how ill someone is.' Ibid., 38-39 (my emphasis). 156 Ibid, 39.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: IS DE-MEDICALISING ASSISTED DYING A POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE WAY FORWARD?
In the final part of this paper, I wish to address the pros and cons of de-medicalising assisted death in the ways I have suggested are occurring. First, the phenomenon of RFASA has fuelled the debate as to whether assisted dying should be de-criminalised. In 2008, 69 per cent of 2,000 members of the public who participated in a poll conducted for the Sunday Times supported a change in the law so that relatives in RFASA cases are given immunity from prosecution. 157 Moreover, RFASA cases also reveal the importance of non-medicalised parts of the assisted dying process: the presence and support of relatives during the process as part of the individual's subjective experience of a "good" assisted death, and of relatives' subjective experiences regarding their loved one's assisted death.
There is perhaps even room for the argument that relatives' experiences could and should play a role in shaping our understanding of the phenomenon of assisted death, if we are searching for less medicalised conceptions of assisted dying. 158 Although this could be objected to on the basis that a presentation of assisted dying incorporating relatives' experiences would be too emotional, we cannot escape the fact that death and assisted dying are emotional matters and a failure to take due account of this means that we are not seeing the true nature of the phenomenon. But whether a demedicalised model of assisted dying in which relatives are the assistors should be the way forward is a very different matter -the strong emotional attachment clearly raises the issue of objectivity. easier for any vulnerability of the latter to be taken advantage of. Factors that cause prosecution to be in the public interest according to the DPP's policy, such as a non-compassionate motivation and pressure, will be harder to discover if there is no external involvement in the assisted dying process.
For these and other reasons presented below, the model of assisted death this paper advocates is a partially de-medicalised one, involving external assistors.
Although the DPP's policy provides no guarantee of immunity from prosecution and 'each case must be considered on its own facts and on its own merits', 159 it provides general guidance as to the public interest factors for and against prosecution in cases of assisted suicide. Effectively, the publication of this policy, as demanded by the House of Lords in Purdy, has done no more than maintain the status quo, albeit that the reasons for this status quo have now been made clear to the public. 160 But the publication of the DPP's statement of policy may well mean that relatives who accompany an individual abroad for an assisted death no longer have to 'run the gauntlet of the criminal law before they can discover whether or not compassion will be exercised'. 161 Moreover, the presentation of the circumstances in which relatives should have little fear of prosecution is likely to make the process of assisted dying a better, less clinical experience for some individuals who seek an assisted suicide abroad. An interview with a woman suffering from multiple sclerosis who planned to go to Switzerland for an assisted death was shown during a BBC News report in July By explicating the public interest arguments against prosecution of assistors in cases of assisted suicide, does the DPP's policy not assist proponents of the legislation of assisted death? Is it not incongruous that we now have clearly stated public interest factors against prosecuting assistors in RFASA cases, at least in part for reasons of compassion, yet individuals who wish to die and those who accompany them are forced to go abroad to receive medical assistance to die? Could this be first step on a path that will lead to the eventual de-criminalisation of assisted dying? 163 If so, the demedicalisation of the debate surrounding assisted suicide may ultimately strengthen the case for lifting the prohibition on (probably medicalised) assisted death. 164 There remains a large chasm between maintaining the legal prohibition on assisted suicide whilst publishing public interest factors against prosecution, and de-criminalising assisted suicide. However, when taken with the results of the polls referred to above, the publication of the DPP's policy can only draw attention to the marked discrepancy between on the one hand, the law on assisted suicide as laid down in statute and on the other, the law as applied in practice and public opinion. At the very least, high profile cases involving the matters of RFASA and RAS such as Purdy and the Gilderdale case ensure that assisted death and the moral legitimacy of the current legal position continue to be significant matters for public debate. 165 In Purdy, Lord Brown presented a scenario involving: a loved one, in desperate and deteriorating circumstances, who regards the future with dread and has made a fully informed, voluntary and fixed decision to die, needing another's compassionate help and support to accomplish that end… is assistance in those circumstances necessarily to be deprecated? Are there not cases in which… many might regard such conduct as if anything to be commended rather than condemned? In short, as it seems to me, there will on occasion be situations where… it would be possible to regard 163 See also R It is important to bear in mind that the medical profession does not appear to be keen to be involved in legalised assisted dying. A survey completed by 3733 medical professionals in [2007] [2008] revealed that the majority were not in favour of legalising euthanasia or PAS. 172 This position is supported by a vote taken regarding whether to support calls to legalise assisted death for patients who are 'terminally ill and have mental capacity' at a BMA conference held in July 2009. 173 Undoubtedly, it is the principle of non-maleficence that lies at the heart of the profession's reluctance to assist in facilitating and causing a patient's death. 174 It is thus of note that Capron has suggested that the role of the doctor in an assisted death could be reduced to simply providing the prescription, so that 'the physician is actually under less of a psychological or a moral impediment to acting.' 175 But if the main motivation behind permitting assisted death is one of compassion, then arguably, the final act causing death should involve a doctor. Medicalised assisted death or euthanasia is the better option because doctors are better able to deal with the situation if things go wrong. 176 Will a non-medic assistor be equipped to deal with situation where, for example, the individual vomits back the drugs? 177 Bosshard refers to a Swiss case in which two individuals who wished to die were still alive (in a coma) several hours after they had taken the lethal drug and an Exit volunteer suffocated them both with a plastic bag. 178 To be able to deal with such eventualities, however, the assistor in the final act does not necessarily have to be a doctor, but could instead be a specially trained nurse. Indeed, in the context of the Swiss model of assisted death, it has been contended that where the volunteer is a nurse who has special training and experience, the final part of the assisted suicide process may be safer than if assistance were provided by a GP who has no specialist training and has not assisted in a suicide before.
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Whilst an appropriately trained nurse could well fulfil this role at the end of the assisted dying process, the involvement of a medical professional at an earlier stage in the process remains necessary to make assessments that require medical expertise, such as whether any mental condition might be impairing a person's capacity. As I will argue below, non-medical concerns relating to the individual's free will can be assessed by someone without medical expertise, but evaluating certain aspects of capacity such as impairment of cognition requires psychiatric knowledge. 180 Moreover, to convince those who are wary of legal reform to permit assisted dying because of concerns about ensuring that it is the free will of the person that s/he wishes to die, involving a doctor to evaluate the psychiatric aspects of capacity will in all likelihood have to be an essential requirement of any law permitting assisted death. Indeed, when Lord Alderdice sought to add a clause to the Coroners and Justice Bill 2009 (now Act) in the House of Lords which would have permitted assisted suicide where a coroner investigated the circumstances and was satisfied that it was the 'free and settled wish' of the individual to die, the coroner's involvement in this matter was immediately rejected by other peers. 181 Looking to the Swiss model again, as already noted, a doctor must conclude that a person is competent. This is also a matter ascertained (separately) by the volunteer from the right-to-die organisation. In cases where it is ascertained that depression affects an individual's capacity for decision-making, the right-to-die organisation will not provide 179 the right-to-die organisation in making assessments as to decision-making capacity. However, it is arguable that given the nature of the organisation, the assistor may lack objectivity regarding the request for assisted suicide. Significantly, in their study of the way in which assisted suicide requests were dealt with by Exit, Bosshard et al state: 'we do not know how much the Exit Staff members were able to maintain the neutrality required for an objective assessment rather than succumbing to over-identification with the applicant's particular point of view.' 188 This may always be a concern 185 176 medical professionals provided qualitative comments regarding a policy to permit medically assisted dying. 31 per cent were in favour of such a policy and 27 per cent of these participants stated that there was a need for non-medics to carry out assisted death. Seale, 2009: 208-209 . There is evidence to suggest that a significant proportion of members of the medical profession are not in favour of a change in the law to provide immunity to relatives in RFASA cases. At the same BMA conference referred to above, 52 per cent of BMA members opposed calls to revise the law so that cases of RFASA are exempted from prosecution. 'Doctors oppose legal protection for assisted suicide relatives', above, n. when the non-medic playing a role in the assisted dying process is from a right-to-die organisation.
Conversely, if lack of objectivity is an issue, we might ask why we should trust doctors to behave more impartially than anyone else? Some doctors will be pro-assisted dying, some will be against.
Would we choose not to trust the judgement of doctors who support assisted dying just because of their personal views? At least in the case of volunteers from right-to-die organisations, their personal views are known and provided checks regarding the procedure of assisted dying are in place, this should not pose a threat to the safety of the process.
Related to this latter point, a final further reason for advocating a fuller role in the assisted dying process for the medical professional could be to ensure adequate review of the assisted dying process, whether this is prospective or retrospective review, and to better guarantee public accountability. 189 However, this could again be ensured by the involvement of a professional nonmedic who is accountable for their actions to a professional regulatory body, and by ensuring there are proper checks and controls throughout the assisted dying process. It is significant that whether the assistor is a doctor, a non-medic professional or a relative, a relationship of trust is an important common denominator in all cases of assisted death. Those whose death is assisted trust that their assistors will fulfil their wishes and act in their interests rather than in self interest. The matter of public trust is also important -the public must trust those given the responsibility of assisting death to do so only in appropriate cases. 190 This suggests that any professional person involved should belong to a profession in which the public are willing to place their trust.
In essence then, if a partially de-medicalised model of assisted death is perceived to be desirable, the way forward could be a less medicalised, team based approach to assisted death. This could involve a doctor who would deal with the medical aspects of an individual's competency, 189 See also Salem, 1999: 32. 190 This could well be the reason why the members of the public who took part in the British Social Attitudes survey in 2005 were less likely to support RAS than assisted dying involving a doctor. See Cleary et al, 2007: 42. confirm that any requirements regarding the existence of and nature of a medical condition are met and ensure that alternative treatment options had been explored. A non-medic professional familiar to the patient could then step in to address non-medical aspects of competency and to provide a supportive role throughout the remainder of the process, and a specially trained nurse could assist in the final act of assisted death. External review of the process to ensure that regulations are complied with could be carried out by regional review committees along the lines of the Dutch approach. 191 Such partial de-medicalisation of assisted dying should occur in this jurisdiction to avoid other concerns that remain whilst UK residents must travel abroad for lawful assisted suicide, concerns which are outside of the remit of this paper. 192 One possible option would be that this form of assisted death becomes part of the palliative care available in the UK, with assisted dying becoming available as a last resort either at a hospice, or, if practical (and affordable), in the person's home.
One of the first questions that would need to be answered to ascertain the feasibility of such an approach is whether non-medic professionals would be willing to be involved in an assisted does not necessarily indicate that those nurses supporting assisted suicide would be willing to assist in the final act of suicide, it does at least suggest that a significant number of nurses do not consider the concept of assisted suicide to conflict with their professional ethics. The matter of ethics is also an issue for the professional non-medics who would be involved at other stages in the process.
Would clergypersons feel comfortable taking on such a role given that, if they ascertain that an 191 See above, n.128. 192 Such as the fact that law makers in this jurisdiction have no control over the Swiss legal provisions. 193 'RCN neutral on assisted suicide', above, n.173.
individual is competent and this accords with doctor's view, the door is then opened for the individual to go ahead and commit assisted suicide? Could they reconcile their facilitating role with their faith? If indeed there are such faith-based concerns, then the involvement of social workers might be more appropriate. However, if one of the purposes of de-medicalisation is to make the person who will have an assisted death more at ease by being surrounded by familiar people, would it not be necessary to consider the likelihood of the person who wishes to die having an existing professional relationship with a social worker? Or would this familiarity with a non-medic professional be gained during the assisted dying process? It is clear that partial de-medicalisation though the involvement of non-medics in the assisted dying process raises a number of questions that would have to be carefully addressed.
Turning finally to the possibility of de-medicalising assisted death by extending the legitimacy of assisting death where the cause of suffering is non-medical, since the British Social Attitudes Survey indicates that the general public would be less keen to support assisted death in such circumstances, it seems this would be a step too far if any legal reform is to be consistent with the views held by a significant proportion of UK citizens. But the problem here may in fact be that assisted death is so commonly presented within a medicalised framework that the idea that a person should be able to receive assistance to die when suffering is existential receives little attention. If the concept of existential suffering was better defined and more familiar, this might well lead to a more informed public debate on whether assisted death should be de-medicalised in this way. It should give us pause for thought that our preoccupation with the medical model of assisted death means that we are failing to give due regard to the parts of the subjective experience of suffering that are not medical. phenomenon that inevitably possesses significant medical aspects whilst medicine and physicians offer the greatest chance of a "good" death. Given that legal, ethical, political and social discourses continue to reveal a preference for a medicalised model of assisted dying, the pragmatic way forward may well be to continue to present such a model in order to achieve legal reform. That is, even if there is no logical basis for a predominantly medicalised model, it is arguably better to advocate the model that is more likely to be acceptable to the legislature and the public. 196 An analogy can be drawn here to the way in which abortion was "sold" to the legislature in the 1960s.
Whilst the medicalised model of abortion has been heavily critiqued, 197 at least framing abortion in this way secured a vital change in the law. Unless and until assisted dying in some form is decriminalised, any partially de-medicalised model of assisted dying may be more idealistic than realistic. But it remains the case that, as with abortion, death and assisted death by no means sit exclusively within the domain of medicine. 198 The examples of the de-medicalisation of assisted death that have formed the focus of this paper serve to emphasise the critical social and emotional aspects of death and the dying process, and to question the appropriateness of physician
